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Global sourcing through foreign subsidiaries and suppliers: Challenges for Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Dr Andreas Rühmkorf, Lecturer in Commercial Law, University of Sheffield 
Introduction 
Most transnational corporations increasingly rely on foreign subsidiaries and suppliers for their 
production of goods.
1
 Companies have usually developed a sophisticated and complex global 
sourcing strategy in order to reduce costs.
2
 Following recurrent reports about human rights violations 
at supplier factories in the developing world, many companies pursue a sustainable supply chain 
management policy.
3
 They publicise information about how they work towards improving working 
conditions in their corporate group and supply chain. This engagement is usually part of the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ^ŽĐŝĂůZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?^Z ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? 
However, from a legal perspective, the use of foreign subsidiaries and suppliers constitute significant 
challenges for the promotion of CSR.
4
  The territorial nature of law, the separate legal personality of 
companies and weak law enforcement mechanisms in the developing countries where the 
production takes place create loopholes which make it difficult to hold Western transnational 
corporations legally accountable for irresponsible corporate conduct within their global production 
network.
5
 This chapter will first look at the challenges for CSR posed by the use of foreign subsidiaries 
and suppliers in their global sourcing. It will then critically discuss to what extent the home state of 
transnational corporations could fill those gaps by legal regulation.
6
 To that end, the chapter will 
discuss tort law, criminal law and disclosure requirements. It will also critically review if the multi-
stakeholder initiative Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, created after the Rana Plaza 
building collapse, could be a model for the future promotion of CSR.
7
 The chapter will argue that it is 
time that the home states of transnational corporations accept their responsibility for regulating the 
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socially responsible conduct of those companies. In terms of its jurisdictional scope, the chapter 
focusses on English law. 
1. Global sourcing strategies: The use of foreign subsidiaries and suppliers  
The outsourcing of the production of goods is an important strategic tool of transnational 
corporations to remain competitive.
8
 This is particularly the case in cost-driven industries such as the 
garment industry or in the production of electronic devices.
9
 Whilst in these instances companies try 
to reduce the cost of manual labour, other industries such as the confectionery industry need the 
supply of raw materials from overseas, for example cocoa beans.
10
 The global sourcing strategy of 
many transnational corporations includes foreign subsidiaries and/or suppliers, often based in the 
developing world. 
Whilst companies have always sourced raw materials from overseas, the strategic use of manual 
labour as a cost-saving tool has particularly developed since the early 1990s.
11
 Transnational 
corporations employ different global sourcing strategies: They can use directly-owned foreign 
subsidiaries for the production or local firms as contractual partners (suppliers).
12
 Where trade takes 
place between transnational corporations and their subsidiaries abroad, and between foreign 
subsidiaries in different countries, this is referred to as  ‘intrafirm sourcing ?.13 Over the last decades, 
many transnational corporations have developed their global production mechanisms in a way that 
they increasingly use suppliers instead of wholly-owned subsidiaries.
14
 Under this sourcing strategy, 
the production relies on independent foreign suppliers.
15
 These suppliers are linked to the 
transnational corporation through contracts and together they form a network of suppliers.
16
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rd
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The organisation of the supply chain, which commonly spans over different continents, is described 
as supply chain management.
17
 The supply chain can be developed in a way that the whole 
production process is outsourced and transnational corporations purely organise the production 
process and retain the brand. A good example is NIKE that has, for decades, designed and marketed 
shoes in the United States which are all produced in factories abroad where the production costs are 
lower.
18
 This strategic separation ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůEŽƌƚŚĂŶĚtĞƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
factories in the developing world has now become a standard business strategy, particularly in cost-
driven industries such as the textile industry.  
However, whilst there are clear economic benefits of creating a complex global supply chain, there 
are recurrent reports about human rights violations such as the use of forced labour at foreign 
factories. Such incidents have had a negative impact on the reputation of Western transnational 
corporations that source from suppliers in the developing world.
19
 As a consequence of increasing 
public and political pressure, many transnational corporations have developed sustainable supply 
chain management as a strategic instrument to demonstrate that they are socially responsible in 
their global sourcing process.
20
 Companies with a global supply chain now commonly have CSR 
policies in place that address issues such as the prohibition of forced labour. To that end, many 
Western transnational companies have developed their own CSR code of conduct or have signed up 
to an international CSR standard.
21
 dŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŽǁŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌŝĞƐŽĨƚĞŶĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŽƌ
a similar code of conduct. As the suppliers are not owned by the transnational corporation, the 
Western companies as the buyers in the supply chain regularly use their bargaining power to 
incorporate their CSR code of conduct into their supply chain contracts.
22
  
Whilst it is evident that transnational corporations have increasingly addressed CSR issues in their 
global supply chain, the effectiveness of these regimes is a different question. Despite at least two 
decades of CSR policies, the reports about CSR violations repeat themselves.
23
 The 2013 Rana Plaza 
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building collapse is a strong reminder of the fact that we are far off from having achieved responsible 
corporate conduct throughout global supply chains.
24
 
2. Legal challenges for CSR through foreign subsidiaries and suppliers 
This situation raises the question to what extent global sourcing through foreign subsidiaries and 
suppliers constitute legal challenges for the promotion of CSR. 
2.1. No binding international law framework 
So far, the legal discussion about CSR and transnational corporations has been particularly prominent 
in the public international law literature.
25
 It is important to note that there is no binding 
international human rights framework for transnational corporations. International human rights 
initiatives for transnational corporations are primarily soft law. For example, the UN Global Compact 
which is widely adopt by companies as part of their CSR agenda ǁĂƐŶŽƚŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽďĞĂ ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ
ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ? ?26 The Global Compact contains ten principles on human rights, labour standards, 
environmental protection and fighting corruption, but it is not a code of conduct.
27
 Corporations who 
have subscribed to it are required to submit examples of how they have complied with the Principles 
on an annual basis.
28
 The only control mechanism of the UN Global Compact is that the Global 
Compact can exclude members who severely violate the principles.
29
 
In recent years, the UN Guiding Principles of Businesses and Human Rights have been the focal point 
of discussions about the responsibilities of transnational corporations for the working conditions at 
factories abroad that they source from.
30
  The Guiding Principles were the result of the six year 
mandate of Professor John Ruggie as UN Special Representative for Business and Human Rights.
31
 
They have ďĞĞŶĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ĂůĂŶĚŵĂƌŬŝŶƚŚĞ^ZĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ?32 The normative contribution of the Guiding 
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Principles lies not in the creation of new international law obligations, but in elaborating the 
implications of existing standards and practices for states and businesses.
33
 The Guiding Principles 
distinguish between the duties of states and the responsibilities of companies in order to indicate 
that respecting rights is not an obligation that current international human rights law generally 
imposes directly upon companies.
34
 The Guiding Principles are intended to be implemented by 
countries and by companies.
35
 This aspect is important as it recognises that there is a role for the 
home state of transnational corporations to regulate transnational corporations. 
2.2. The limiting effects of the shareholder value theory for the promotion of CSR 
Transnational corporations in the United Kingdom or the United States operate within the 
shareholder value paradigm which is based on an agency model of the company.
36
 This theoretical 
framing of the corporation mandates that it is the primary task of the management to be exclusively 
accountable to the shareholders and to maximize their profit.
37
 Consequently, the shareholders must 
be prioritized in the decision-making process.
38
 In English law, this theoretical framing of the 
company is legally embedded in s172 (1) of the Companies Act (CA) 2006, i.e. the duty to promote 
the success of the company.
39
 tŚŝůƐƚƚŚŝƐĚƵƚǇĂůůŽǁĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ‘ƚŽŚĂǀĞƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨ
various stakeholders, including suppliers, it requires directors to ultimately prioritise the interests of 
shareholders.
40
 
This purpose of the company directly influences the way how company directors engage with CSR in 
their global supply chain, be it through its own foreign subsidiaries or a network of overseas 
suppliers. Under this model of the firm, companies will only promote CSR to the extent that it can be 
based on the business case in the interest of shareholders, i.e. that it promotes the reputation of the 
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of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business and (f) the need to act fairly between 
members of the company. 
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firm.
41
 The voluntary engagement of transnational corporations with CSR in their global production is 
therefore limited. Rather, transnational corporations focus on the strategic use of foreign 
subsidiaries and suppliers as a cost-saving instrument.
42
 
2.3. Territorial limits of the law and the legal structure of companies 
The violation of CSR principles at factories run by either subsidiaries or suppliers of transnational 
corporations in the developing world pose a significant challenge due to the territorial nature of the 
law and the legal personality of companies.  
First, the law that is primarily applicable to irresponsible corporate conduct at factories in the 
developing world such as tort law or criminal law is the law of those countries where the particular 
incidents have occurred.
43
 For example, the laws applicable to the Rana Plaza Building collapse are, 
first and foremost, the laws of Bangladesh. This situation can constitute a challenge where the 
substantive law of the country where the violation of CSR principles took place has, for example, 
lower standards in criminal law and tort law.
44
 More often, however, it is not so much the 
substantive law that is weak in those countries, but rather the law enforcement mechanisms. 
Secondly, most transnational corporations do not own the factories that produce for them; rather, 
the production is done by either foreign subsidiaries which are owned by the transnational 
corporations or by foreign suppliers. The difference between subsidiaries and suppliers is that 
subsidiaries are owned by the Western transnational company, whereas suppliers are usually 
completely independent from the transnational company, i.e. they are owned by other people who 
are not linked to the transnational corporation. The different ownership structure of the two forms  W 
foreign subsidiaries and suppliers  W has also consequences for the liability of the transnational 
corporation. Supplier companies are legally completely independent companies from the 
transnational corporation as they are owned by different people. However, there is often a strong 
economic dependence of the suppliers on the transnational corporation as the buyer of their 
                                                          
41
 See A Kurucz, B ŽůďĞƌƚĂŶĚtŚĞĞůĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĐĂƐĞĨŽƌŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ^ŽĐŝĂůZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶA Crane, A 
McWilliams, D Matten et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (OUP 2008) 83 - 112. 
42
 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?dŚĞ'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ ? ‘dŚĞĂŶŐůĂĚĞƐŚĨĂĐƚŽƌǇĐ ůůĂƉƐĞ PǁŚǇ^ZŝƐŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚĂŶĞǀĞƌ ? ? ?
May 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/bangladesh-factory-collapse-
csr-important (accessed 22 June 2015). 
43
 ^ĞĞĨŽƌĂŶŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞůĂǁŽĨƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŽƌƚ ? PDĐůĞĂŶĂŶĚsZƵŝǌ ?The Conflict of 
Laws (8
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 12-003. 
44
 Muchlinski notes that the principal jurisdiction level for the regulation of multinational enterprises remains 
the nation state, see P Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises & The Law (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2007) chapters 3 and 4. 
goods.
45
 Their conduct could reflect on the transnational corporation in terms of reputation, but not 
in terms of legal liability. 
Foreign subsidiaries, on the other hand, are linked to the transnational corporation through 
ownership.
46
 The transnational corporation holds the majority of the shares of the subsidiary, often it 
is even the sole shareholder, making the other company its wholly-owned subsidiary.
47
 The 
transnational corporation as the parent company can decide, for example, who the directors of the 
subsidiary are and it benefits from its profits. However, in English law, even wholly-owned 
subsidiaries are legal entities which are separate and independent from the parent company.
48
 This is 
a consequence of the Salomon v Salomon principle which has established that companies have a 
separate legal personality from their shareholders.
49
 This principle has been expanded to corporate 
groups with the effect that the parent companies are not vicariously liable for the conduct of their 
subsidiaries.
50
 
3. Critical review of existing attempts to regulate CSR in global sourcing 
In the absence of binding human rights obligations on transnational corporations in international 
law, other regulatory mechanisms for the promotion of CSR in the global production have been 
attempted. Most of these are private governance initiatives which are developed and governed in 
the private sphere between companies, sometimes involving third parties such as non-governmental 
organisations.
51
 Other regulatory initiatives rely on the home state of transnational corporations such 
as the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). This section will critically review these measures in terms of 
their ability to promote the socially responsible conduct of transnational companies. 
3.1. CSR based on private governance schemes 
Many transnational corporations with well-known brands are vulnerable to reputational risks and 
have therefore voluntarily adopted codes of conduct that address the way how they run their 
business.
52
 Such codes of conduct usually establish principles of good business conduct that the 
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company pledges to comply with.
53
 Transnational corporations increasingly incorporate their code of 
conduct into their business relations with their suppliers, for example through their supply 
contracts.
54
 Depending on the way how the principles in the codes of conduct are phrased, they can 
hereby become contractually enforceable clauses.
55
 
At first sight, such private governance regimes appear to be a useful tool to achieve greater socially 
responsible conduct across the global supply chain of transnational corporations. Through codes of 
conduct, transnational companies can bind themselves to human rights obligations which are 
otherwise only contained in international soft law standards.
56
 Moreover, by giving these principles 
contractual force within their supplier contracts, the transnational companies are able to transcend 
the territorial limits of law and they can thus impose human rights standards on suppliers in the 
developing world.  
However, despite their widespread use amongst most transnational corporations, private CSR 
governance regimes have not prevented the repeated violations of human rights at supplier factories 
in the developing world. Recent examples of irresponsible corporate conduct at supplier factories 
include the fire at the textile factory Tazreen Fashions in Bangladesh (November 2012), the 
widespread use of forced labour in the Thai fishing industry (June 2014), breaches of working time 
and safety equipment provision in the production of electronic devices in China (July 2014), and, 
most notably, the deadly Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh (May 2013).
57
 All these 
violations of CSR principles occurred despite the public awareness of human rights breaches in global 
sourcing and the CSR policies of most transnational corporations. 
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Moreover, where the CSR principles have been violated within these private governance systems, the 
transnational corporations got away with impunity. There is no sanction system such as in state-
based regulation that applies in case the CSR principles are not complied with. Companies only have 
to face reputational concerns. Where the CSR codes of conduct are incorporated into the contracts 
between transnational corporations and their suppliers, the monitoring of compliance and the 
enforcement depends on the Western transnational company as the obligations fall on their 
suppliers.
58
 The workers of the suppliers as the intended beneficiaries of the contractual CSR clauses 
do not gain any right of enforcement.
59
 And while many transnational corporations have increased 
their efforts to monitor the compliance of their direct suppliers (also called first-tier suppliers), the 
majority of violations of CSR principles occur further down the supply chain through subcontracting.
60
 
These factories are beyond the reach of the supply chain contracts between the transnational 
corporations and their direct suppliers which contain the CSR codes of conduct. The private 
governance based CSR compliance system therefore allow transnational companies to publicly 
portray themselves as responsible whereas, in reality, subcontracting means that these systems 
often fail to address those factories where the human rights violations occur. 
3.2. The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh: A multi-stakeholder initiative 
After the deadly Rana Plaza building collapse serious concerns were raised about the effectiveness of 
the existing CSR mechanisms in global supply chains. In fact, the building was audited twice by 
Primark before it collapsed, but the audit did not include a structural survey.
61
 This situation 
illustrates the failure of the existing private governance system of CSR promotion, based on the 
 ‘ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ ?ŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐĂŶĚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ^ZďǇƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂůŽŶĞ ? 
Due to their failure to prevent the Rana Plaza disaster the transnational companies in the fashion 
industry which source ready-made garment from Bangladesh were under significant public and 
political pressure.
62
 In response, the fashion industry came up with different initiatives aimed at 
improving the situation in Bangladesh. A particularly interesting approach in this context is the 
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Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh as a multi-stakeholder initiative.
63
 Its structure and 
mode of operation will be critically assessed here in order to discuss whether or not it could be a 
model for future CSR mechanisms in global sourcing. 
The Accord, established in May 2013, is intended to improve the safety of garment factories in 
Bangladesh. More than two years after its development, in June 2015, the agreement was signed by 
over 200 apparel brands, retailers and importers from over 20 countries, most of which are from 
Europe; two global trade unions (IndustriALL and UNI); and eight Bangladesh trade unions and four 
NGO witnesses such as the Clean Clothes Campaign.
64
 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
acts as the independent chair of the Accord. This initiative covers all suppliers of the companies that 
have signed the Accord.
65
 It is a five-year legally binding agreement. It stipulates that independent 
safety inspections must take place at the factories that the signatory companies source from in 
Bangladesh. The factories are divided into tier 1, tier 2 and tier 3 factories depending on their share 
ŽĨƚŚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŽƌǇĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶin Bangladesh by volume.  
Where flaws are identified the signatory company that sources from this factory is under an 
obligation to require the supplier factory to implement the corrective actions that were identified by 
the inspectors.
66
 Additionally, in the event of safety flaws being identified, the signatory companies 
also commit to ensuring that sufficient funds are available for the corrective actions and that those 
who work at the factories in question continue to be paid.
67
 The Accord also provides transparency 
by the regular publication of the list of all suppliers in Bangladesh used by the signatory companies, 
written inspection reports for all factories inspected under the Accord and quarterly aggregate 
reports that summarise both aggregate industry compliance data.
68
 
The work of the Accord is funded through an annual membership fee paid by the signatory 
companies which depends on their yearly volume of sourcing from Bangladesh.
69
 The signatory 
companies commit to maintain their sourcing relationships with Bangladesh. The Accord is governed 
by a Steering Committee which consists of equal representation chosen by the trade union members 
and company members of the agreement (maximum three seats each) and a representation from 
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69
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and chosen by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as a neutral chair.
70
 Disputes are regulated 
in the way that, in the first instance, the Steering Committee decides by majority vote within a 
maximum of 21 days of a petition being filed. By request of either party the decision of the Steering 
Committee may be appealed to a final and binding arbitration process. The arbitration award is 
enforceable in a court of law of the domicile of the signatory against whom enforcement is sought.
71
 
Through the involvement of different stakeholder groups in its governance structure and through the 
provision of remedial action, the Accord goes beyond the previous attempts to promote CSR 
standards at factories in the developing world. The Accord is a clear improvement as it does not rely 
on the transnational corporations alone. It can therefore be argued that future credible approaches 
to better promoting CSR principles in global supply chains should build on these positive features of 
the Accord. 
However, the Accord has several weaknesses. First, it does not have universal reach amongst 
transnational companies in the textile industry. Its signatory companies are primarily European 
textile companies whereas the majority of US-American companies that source ready-made garment 
from Bangladesh did not agree to this initiative.
72
 Instead, they created the Alliance for Bangladesh 
Worker Safety which relies on a voluntary, business-driven scheme structure.
73
 In effect, the Alliance, 
by and large, continues to operate in the same way as the companies have addressed CSR prior to 
Rana Plaza. Secondly, the Accord is a five-year plan with no clarity yet what is going to happen after 
its expiry date. It is quite possible that the signatory companies involved might then declare that 
sufficient improvements have been made so that, in their view, the scheme would not need to be 
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Thirdly, the Accord is only a single-issue initiative that is restricted to one country. It is a reaction to a 
much reported disaster as companies felt the pressure to publicly demonstrate commitment to 
engage with the cause of the factory collapse, i.e. the poor health and safety standards at factories in 
Bangladesh. It is important to bear in mind that global supply chains with poor health and safety 
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standards exist in many other countries of the developing world, too.
74
 Moreover, the violations of 
CSR principles in global supply chain is not restricted to health and safety breaches alone; there are 
many other pressing issues that urgently need to be addressed, too, such as the use of forced 
labour.
75
 Finally, first reports about the effectiveness of the Accord indicate that the initiative does 
not cover the large-scale subcontracting that it still taking place in the industry.
76
 The inspections  ‘ĨĂŝů
ƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚƌŝƐŬƐŽĨƚŚŝƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? which occur further down the supply chain.77 
Two years after Rana Plaza and the development of the Accord, transnational corporations have still 
not worked together to create similar multi-stakeholder initiatives for other CSR issues and other 
countries. This situation shows that though the Accord is an improvement of the pre-Rana Plaza 
world, we are still far from witnessing a new era in the promotion of CSR.   
3.3. Tort law: The liability of the parent company 
Due to the challenges that many tort victims of foreign subsidiaries and suppliers experience with 
access to justice in their home countries, there is an ongoing discussion about the tortious liabilities 
of transnational corporations that source from factories where CSR principles are violated.
78
 
Companies are liable in tort through vicarious liability.
79
 This is not a tort in its own right, but a rule of 
responsibility which means that the company is liable for the actions of other people such as 
employees.
80
 
The prospect of making claims against the transnational corporation at the head of the global supply 
chain is attractive for the promotion of CSR as these companies usually have better financial means 
and are based in Western countries which often provide easier access to justice. Moreover, 
transnational corporations with well-known brands are concerned about the reputational damage 
that results, for example, from losing a case linked to human rights violations. It is exactly for these 
reasons that transnational corporations are commonly strongly opposed to be subjected to claims by 
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victims of torts committed at the factories of their subsidiaries and suppliers.
81
 However, the 
structure of global supply chains makes it difficult to hold transnational companies liable. Although 
companies can be sued for torts committed by other people, the challenge for legal liability for the 
relevant torts here is that they occur at factories operated by subsidiaries and suppliers abroad. In 
the case of suppliers, this situation means that the tort is committed by a company which is legally 
completely separate from the transnational corporation as there is no link between the two through 
ownership. 
Even where the torts are committed by the foreign subsidiaries of transnational corporations, the 
tort victims do not have a cause of action against the transnational corporation in English law 
either.
82
 All companies in a group of companies are separate legal entities, even in case of wholly-
owned subsidiaries with only little paid-up share capital and a board of directors which 
predominately or solely consists of directors who are also directors of the parent company.
83
 
Corporate group structures enable parent companies to reduce their liability risk in tort.
84
 The 
consequence of this approach is that tort victims of a subsidiary company might not be able to 
recover their loss, if the subsidiary is undercapitalised.
85
 In Adams v Cape Industries plc, the Court of 
Appeal applied a strict approach to the question of piercing the corporate veil in corporate groups 
and dismissed the idea of a single economic unit between the parent company and its subsidiaries.
86
 
The court held that the corporate veil could in only be pierced where special circumstances exist 
which indicate that the corporate veil is a mere façade concealing the true facts, i.e. where the 
corporate structure is used to evade rights of relief that third parties may in the future acquire.  
Slade LJ noted: 
There is no general principle that all companies in a group of companies are to be regarded 
ĂƐŽŶĞ ?KŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ?ƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŝƐƚŚĂƚ “ĞĂĐŚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨ
companies (a relatively modern concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal 
rights ĂŶĚůŝĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? PƐĞĞThe Albazero [1975] 3 All ER 21, 28.87 
Slade LJ also stated that the use of the corporate group by a parent company as a means to ensure 
that legal liability in respect of future activities of the group will fall on another member of that group 
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ǁĂƐ ‘ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚŝŶŽƵƌĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞůĂǁ ? ?The consequence is that the risk is allocated to the poorer risk 
taker, the tort victim.
88
 This approach does not only disregard the fact that it puts tort victims as 
involuntary creditors at a severe disadvantage; it also overlooks that limited liability was developed 
in the 19
th
 century to promote business activities by investors, whereas nowadays parent companies 
strategically use corporate group structures with a range of (foreign) subsidiaries as an instrument to 
reduce their liability risks.
89
 Moreover, the rejection of the idea of group liability ignores the 
economic realities of corporate groups. Parent companies usually maintain close ties with their 
subsidiaries and they effectively control the running of these companies. The parent companies 
therefore benefit from the gains made by the subsidiaries whilst they avoid liability for their 
obligations. English law is also not coherent in its strict application of the Salomon v Salomon 
principle as parent companies must prepare group accounts pursuant to s399 (2) CA 2006.
90
 
This approach of English courts to group liability constitutes a significant challenge for the promotion 
of CSR, as tort victims are unable to make a claim against the transnational corporation as the parent 
company for the torts committed by its foreign subsidiaries. It is argued here that this approach 
needs to be changed in order to promote greater social responsibility of transnational corporations. 
The strategic use of subsidiaries to limit their liability risks contributes to the irresponsible conduct 
that continues to occur at factories in the developing world. 
A potentially different avenue to address the same issue is to hold transnational corporations 
primarily liable in tort for the working conditions at the factories of their subsidiaries. In the case 
Chandler v Cape plc it was held that a parent company can owe a primary duty of care in negligence 
to the employees of its subsidiary.
91
 In this case, the defendant company Cape plc, as the parent 
company, was directly and jointly liable with its subsidiary (which had been dissolved in the 
meantime) in negligence for asbestos-ƌĞůĂƚĞĚŝŶũƵƌŝĞƐŝŶĨůŝĐƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ
(the claimant). Prior to this decision, there had been a longstanding debate about the question of 
whether or not such a primary duty exists in English law, but this issue was never formally decided by 
a court as the cases were either settled or struck out for other reasons.
92
 The difference between this 
case and the previous discussion about group liability is that, in Chandler v Cape plc, the parent 
company was held to have breached a duty of care which it directly owed to the employees of its 
subsidiary company. This duty of care was imposed on the parent company on the basis of an 
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assumption of responsibility as the parent company had superior knowledge of the asbestos-related 
risks that the employees of its subsidiary were exposed to. Moreover, it dictated the overall health 
and safety policy of its subsidiaries and it also exercised control over their business behaviour to an 
extent that it had the ability to intervene. 
The imposition of a direct duty of care on the parent company is distinct from any question of 
piercing the corporate veil as this approach respects the separate legal personality of the two 
companies. Rather, parent companies are liable for their own failure to protect the employees of its 
subsidiaries which resulted in their harm. Chandler v Cape plc sets an important precedent for the 
legal responsibility of parent companies as it restricts the ability of parent companies to completely 
outsource their liability where they clearly have superior knowledge and are the dominant force 
within the group. However, it is unclear to what extent this precedent which concerned a particularly 
dangerous industry related to asbestos might be applied to other business areas and to cases 
between UK-based transnational corporations and their foreign subsidiaries as the facts underlying 
this decision occurred in the UK.    
3.4. Tort law: The US Alien Tort Claims Act 
Whilst this chapter focusses on English law in its jurisdictional scope, it is important to briefly 
consider the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in this context as this statute has, for some time now, 
captured the interest of those interested in home state liability of transnational corporations for 
torts committed abroad.
93
 This Act is, so far, the most successful example of holding parent 
companies liable in tort law.
94
 The ATCA was enacted in 1789, but only re-discovered and creatively 
used by NGOs during the late 20
th
 century. The ATCA confers jurisdiction on the US District Court in 
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ ‘ĂŶǇĐŝǀŝůĂĐƚŝŽŶďǇĂŶĂůŝĞŶĨŽƌĂƚŽƌƚŽŶůǇ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚŝŶǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƌĂ
ƚƌĞĂƚǇŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ? Parent companies based in the USA can be hold accountable for human 
rights violations by their subsidiaries abroad under the ATCA. 
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala the court decided that non-American citizens could be punished for tortious 
acts committed outside the United States which were in violation of public international law or any 
treaties to which the United States is a party.
95
 This decision is important as it extends the jurisdiction 
of United States courts to tortious acts committed around the world. A further significant step for the 
                                                          
93
 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?DĐĂƌŶĞƚĂŶĚW^ĐŚŵŝĚƚ ? ‘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ P
human rights, the Alien Torts ůĂŝŵƐĐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨůĞŐĂůŝŵƉƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŝŶDĐĂƌŶĞƚ ?sŽŝĐƵůĞƐĐƵĂŶĚd
Campbell, The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (CUP 2007) 148.  
94
 A discussion of the Act can be found at A de Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law: 
Accountability in the Global Business Environment (Edward Elgar 2011) 99  W 106.  
95
 630 F 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
use of the ATCA was the decision in Sosa v Alvarez.
96
 Here, the US Supreme Court allowed courts to 
hear claims by private individuals for breaches of international law committed in other countries. 
These decisions were followed by a significant increase of claims against US parent companies. 
However, the courts have been reluctant to assume jurisdiction in cases where the claimants were 
not resident in the United States.  
At present, the future use of the ATCA for tort liabilities of parent companies for tortious acts 
committed outside the United States is uncertain. In Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. the Supreme 
Court decided in April 2013 that the Act would only apply to conduct within the United States or on 
the high seas.
97
 It would not create jurisdiction for a claim regarding conduct that occurred in the 
territory of a foreign sovereign. This decision effectively means that a presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Act. After this decision it is unclear if the ATCA will play 
a significant role for liability related to torts committed at factories of foreign subsidiaries of US 
transnational corporations. This development is unfortunate as the Act was able to fill an 
accountability vacuum. 
Notwithstanding the decision in Kiobel, there is, at the time of writing, ongoing litigation under the 
ATCA concerning the use of forced labour at cocoa firms which supply the confectionery industry. In 
September 2014, a US appeal court held in Doe v Nestle USA Inc. et al. that the claimants were 
allowed to amend their claim against Nestlé, ADM and Cargill so that the defendant companies could 
be held to account for aiding and abetting child slavery in Ivory Coast.
98
 The court reinstated a 
lawsuit filed by three citizens of Mali in 2005 who claim that they were forced to work as child slaves 
on cocoa plantations in Ivory Coast. This judgment overrules a previous decision by a district court 
which had dismissed the case on grounds that US courts had not jurisdiction for abuses committed 
by companies outside the territory of the US. The court held in this case that at least parts of the act 
occurred in the United States. It remains to be seen, however, how the case is finally decided seeing 
in light of Kiobel.  
In summary, tort law is, at least in theory, an attractive avenue for the promotion of greater social 
responsibilities of transnational corporations as it provides remedies for tort victims. However, 
changes are necessary for English tort law to better promote CSR in global sourcing, for example 
group liability would be a strong incentive for transnational companies to use their power to improve 
working conditions at their foreign subsidiaries. 
3.5. Extraterritorial criminal liability: The model of the Bribery Act 
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Criminal law is another area of the law that has much potential to improve the working conditions in 
the global production chain of transnational companies. English law applies criminal law to 
corporations.
99
 Where corporations are criminally liable, the requirements of the criminal act (actus 
reus) and the criminal mind (mens rea) are found in a person acting on behalf of the corporation such 
as the relevant officer.
100
 As companies cannot be imprisoned, they are, if convicted, sanctioned with 
a monetary fine. Like tort law, criminal law is, first and foremost, bound to the territory of the 
jurisdiction where the crime occurs.
101
 Generally speaking, where crimes are committed at factories 
in the developing world, the crime is prosecuted under the laws of that jurisdiction. The advantage of 
criminal law vis-à-vis tort law is that the prosecution is initiated by the state. It does not depend on 
the action being brought by a private individual and therefore, by definition, has a broader reach 
than tort law. Moreover, the threat of criminal conviction acts as a strong deterrence, not just 
because of the financial consequences of convictions, but also because of the reputational concerns. 
Extraterritorial criminal liability of transnational corporations in their home state is therefore an 
attractive idea to better promote CSR in global sourcing. In English law, this approach has been 
introduced in the UK Bribery Act 2010. Common to all cases of bribery in the Bribery Act is the offer 
ŽƌƚĂŬŝŶŐŽĨĂ ‘ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŽƌŽƚŚĞƌĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?102 The Act has a near-universal jurisdiction. This 
approach makes it possible to prosecute an individual or a company with links to the United 
Kingdom, regardless of where the crime occurred. In particular, the Act makes it an offence for 
commercial organisations which have business in the UK to fail to prevent bribery by a person 
associated with it.
103
 The associated person can be an employee, agent, subsidiary or supplier.
104
 
However, the Act also provides a defence for a commercial organisation if it can prove that it had 
adequate procedures in place designed to prevent persons associated with it from undertaking such 
conduct.
105
 dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚ ‘ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞ ?106 
The guidance, inter alia, recommend companies to use due diligence mechanisms such as anti-
bribery terms and conditions in their supply contracts.
107
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The interesting feature of this approach in terms of promoting CSR is that companies can protect 
themselves against liability through taking active steps to prevent bribery in their supply chain. The 
risk of liability combined with the defence of  ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? effectively forces companies 
to take measures aimed at preventing bribery in their supply chain. As the Bribery Act directly 
addresses the transnational corporations it overcomes the limits caused by the territoriality principle 
and the separate legal personality. Transnational corporations cannot outsource their legal 
responsibility for bribery in their supply chain. 
However, as this liability only concerns bribery it will not achieve that companies address other CSR 
issues in their supply chain with the same caution. The range of CSR violations in their supply chain 
goes beyond the committing of bribery. It is a missed opportunity that the legislator did not follow 
the model of the Bribery Act for the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015. There was a discussion about how 
forced labour in the supply chain of UK-based transnational corporations should be addressed in the 
Act.
108
 One of the options discussed was to create criminal liability modelled on the Bribery Act. 
However, this idea was eventually rejected and, instead, a supply chain transparency clause was 
included in the Act.
109
 
3.6. Disclosure: CSR regulation through transparency  
Corporate reporting on CSR, both mandatory on voluntary, has grown exponentially over the last 
years. Based on public pressure and reputational concerns, companies increasingly voluntarily report 
about their engagement with CSR, including their global supply chains. However, these voluntary 
reports are often criticised by NGOS for being public relations instruments that are written in rather 
vague language and that are not verified. At the same time, mandatory reporting requirements have 
been an increasingly popular instrument for governments to require companies to report on their 
engagement with their social responsibilities. 
In English law, the strategic report
110
 which was previously the business review
111
 has the purpose of 
informing members of the company how the directors have performed their duty under section 172 
CA (duty to promote the success of the company). As this duty refers to a range of stakeholders, the 
strategic report could be an instrument to better promote CSR. In case of a quoted company, the 
strategic report must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, 
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issues, including information about any policies of the company in relation to those matters and the 
effectiveness of those policies.
112
 However, if the review does not contain information regarding 
these issues, it must only state which of these categories it does not contain. 
This last sentence of the section shows that quoted companies do not have to report on the range of 
CSR issues such as human rights in the strategic report as long as they declare that their report does 
not contain this information. This is a severe limitation for the promotion of CSR. In effect, the 
reporting about CSR is degraded to a voluntary exercise for directors. Moreover, the law remains 
very vague about what needs to be included in it. The danger is that directors can comply with their 
reporting duty even if they make rather neutral statements.
113
 Research about the predecessor of 
the strategic report, the business review, confirms this sceptical view. A study by Villiers and 
Aiyegbayo, based on semi-structured interviews with key corporate governance actors such as 
investor relations managers and corporate governance directors from institutional investment firms, 
showed that the business review made little difference to the quality of reports.
114
 The authors of 
this study conclude that companies are struggling to report effectively about their non-financial key 
performance indicators.
115
 
The continuing debate about the need to require transnational companies by law to be more socially 
responsible has been taken up by the European Union. A new Directive on nonfinancial information 
disclosure, adopted in 2014, requires public-interest companies with more than 500 employees to 
disclose relevant and material environmental and social information in their annual reports from 
2017 onwards.
116
 The Directive stipulates that the annual report of these companies must include a 
non-financial statement containing information relating to at least environmental, social and 
employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.
117
 This statement 
must include a description of the policy pursued by the company in relation to these matters, the 
results of these policies and the risks related to these matters and how the company manages those 
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risks. Companies that do not pursue policies in relation to one or more of these matters shall provide 
an explanation for not doing so.
118
  
The Directive goes beyond the ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƌĞƉŽƌƚĂƐŝƚŝƐŵŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĂƐŝƚĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŚĞ ‘comply 
ŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ^ZƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ which means that companies have to give an explanation in 
case they do not pursue policies. Although the Directive fails to require external verification of the 
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corporations. The Directive can create a level playing field amongst companies across the European 
Union as it expects companies to have a policy on CSR issues. Still, it remains to be seen to what 
extent companies are going to use this reporting duty as a genuine opportunity to openly and 
critically reflect on their CSR policies.  
The increasing focus on global supply chains has led to the inclusion of a transparency in supply 
chains clause in the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
119
 This clause requires companies of a size that, at the 
time of writing, is yet to be determined to prepare a slavery and human trafficking statement for 
each financial year of the organisation.
120
 In order to comply with this reporting duty, companies 
must either describe the steps that they have taken during the financial year to ensure that slavery 
and human trafficking is not taking place in any of their supply chains, and in any part of its own 
business, or make a statement that they have taken no such steps.  
The strength of the transparency in supply chains clause is that it recognises the important role of 
transnational corporations for the eradication of forced labour in global supply chains. However, the 
clause is rather vague and leaves much discretion to the companies. It fails to establish a 
requirement that companies must have external third party verification of their forced labour 
statement. It is likely that, in most cases, companies will be able to continue to report in the same 
way about how they combat forced labour in their supply chain as they already do in their voluntary 
CSR report. In actual fact, the transparency in supply chains clause resembles many features of the 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 which, too, requires disclosure on the efforts of a 
company on combatting forced labour in its supply chain. However, it is also rather soft with no 
enforcement power and no requirement to have the report externally verified.
121
  
The various reporting requirements pertaining to CSR issues that have been introduced in the past 
years demonstrate that, at the moment, the legal regulation of CSR in global sourcing is primarily 
                                                          
118
 ibid. 
119
 S54 of the Act. 
120
 Home Office, Modern slavery and supply chains consultation (12 February 2015), available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/modern-slavery-and-supply-chains (accessed 2 July 2015). 
121
 The Act is available at: http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0651-
0700/sb_657_bill_20100930_chaptered.html (accessed 15 February 2015). 
transparency laws. Whilst these initiatives are positive steps towards recognising that transnational 
corporations have social responsibilities for the working conditions at the factories of their foreign 
subsidiaries and suppliers, they all lack stringency.  
4. Conclusion 
Recurrent reports about irresponsible corporate conduct by foreign subsidiaries and suppliers of 
Western transnational corporations demonstrate that the mainly voluntary, business-driven, private 
governance regime of CSR in global production chains has failed. Transnational corporations are able 
to hide behind their foreign subsidiaries and suppliers. The division between the corporate 
headquarters in the global North and West and the production in the developing world presents 
challenges for the law to adequately address the violations of CSR principles. Transnational 
corporations outsource both the production and the legal responsibility. Whilst foreign subsidiaries 
already pose a significant challenge for holding transnational corporations as the parent companies 
legally accountable, this situation is even more difficult in case of suppliers which are owned by third 
parties. 
Despite its weaknesses, the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh as multi-stakeholder 
initiative displays some features that future CSR regimes should build on such as its inclusion of 
different stakeholder groups and its access to remedies. However, two years since its development, 
no similar scheme for other countries and other CSR issues has been developed. The danger is that 
the Accord remains a single-issue initiative that resulted from significant public and political pressure 
in the wake of the Rana Plaza disaster. 
In the absence of a binding international human rights framework for transnational corporations, 
there is a growing consensus that the home state of transnational corporations has got a more 
important role to play in the promotion of CSR. The home state could fill some of the legal loopholes 
of global sourcing. However, at present, the regulation of CSR issues is focussed on disclosure laws 
which are not stringent enough to ensure that transnational corporations go beyond their present 
efforts. The chapter has shown that tort law and corporate criminal law could be an important part 
of the legal promotion of CSR, as they have the potential to hold transnational corporations legally 
accountable for irresponsible conduct at factories run by subsidiaries and/or suppliers. However, in 
order to use their full potential, both areas need amendments in English law. 
